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I. SUMMARY OF THE BATTLE FOR CONTROL
The heated contest for control of Piper Aircraft Corporation which
occurred in 1969 spawned a number of lawsuits which culminated in
the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
in March, 1973.1 That decision represents a landmark in the interpreta.
tion and application of the federal securities laws to contests for corpo.
rate control. The decision is the first to grant standing to a defeated con-
testant for corporate control in a tender offer to sue for damages under
§ 14(e) 2 of the Securities Act of 1934.' By implication, the decision also
extends standing to sue for damages to a successful contestant who has
been damaged by the securities laws violations of its opponent. By pro-
viding standing under § 14(e) to contestants for corporate control, Chris-
Craft undoubtedly will retard the expansion of standing under rule
lob-5,4 which has gradually been broadened through exceptions to the
Birnbaum', doctrine.
Chris-Craft has also served to set standards of corporate behavior in
a tender offer contest not only for the target corporation but for the con-
testants and underwriters as well. It has defined the specificity with
which management must evaluate competing tender offers and has incor-
porated the fiduciary duty owed by management of the target corpora-
tion to its shareholders into § 14(e) standards. The area in which Chris.
Craft may have its greatest impact is in defining the standards of conduct
of underwriters in a tender offer. Although the court purportedly ap-
Members of the Ohio Bar.
1 Chris-Craft Indus. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir. 1973). [Hereinafter
referred to as Chris-Craft].
2 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1971). Section 14(e) adopts much of the language of rule 10b.5
in the context of a tender offer:
It shall be unlawful for any person to make any untrue statement of a material
fact or omit to state any material fact necessary in order to make the statement
made, in the light of the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading,
or to engage in any fraudulent, decep:ive, or manipulative acts or practices, in con.
nection with any tender offer or request or invitation for tenders, or any solicita.
don of security holders in opposition to or in favor of any such offer, request, or
invitation....
3 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78jj (1971).
4 17 C.F.R. § 240.1ob-5 (1973).
5 Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952).
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plied the substantive law developed under rule 10b-5, in reality it ex-
panded the duties and liabilities of the underwriter far beyond those
applicable under rule 10-b5.
Chris-Craft has also established an impliedly conclusive presumption
of market effect arising from technical violation of rule 10b-6.0 Under
the Second Circuit's formulation in Chris-Craft, plaintiff need only show
a violation of the technical language of rule 10b-6; thereafter, all that
remains is the question of damages. A violator of the rule cannot es-
cape liability by attempting to show that the transaction involved was
one which the rule was designed not to reach-that is, a transaction
which did not involve an effect on the market.
Lastly, Chris-Craft may have dealt a stunning blow to the availability,
at least in the Second Circuit, of the permanent injunction as a weapon
in the arsenal of the Securities and Exchange Commission against habit-
ual offenders under the securities laws. While the decision did not clar-
ify the standards for injunctive relief in the Second Circuit, it indicated
that even in those cases where the record is replete with securities law
violations, the court of appeals will not reverse the findings of a district
judge who has denied an injunction. Moreover, the opinion can be read
as holding that a showing of an offender's specific intent to violate the
securities laws must be made before the Second Circuit will grant perma-
nent injunctive relief.
The complexity of the facts in the case reflect the intensity of the bat-
tle and will be summarized here. The target company, Piper Aircraft
Corporation, was one of the three leading manufacturers of general air-
craft. Incorporated in 1937, Piper in 1969 was still strongly influenced
by the Piper family, who held three of the eight positions on the board
of directors and owned approximately 501,000 shares out of a total of
1,644,890 outstanding shares.7
Chris-Craft Industries, Inc., the unsuccessful contender, although
principally engaged in the manufacture of recreational products, in 1968
embarked on an aggressive program of expansion through acquisition.
In December of 1968 Chris-Craft focused its attention on Piper and be-
gan purchasing Piper shares on the New York Stock Exchange. By Jan-
uary 22, 1969, Chris-Craft had accumulated more than 200,000 Piper
shares at a cost of $11,500,000, about thirteen percent of the outstand-
ing stock of Piper. During this period, Chris-Craft had made no formal
statement of interest in Piper, and had given no indication that its objec-
617 C.F.R. § 240.10b-6 (1973).
7 Brief for Appellee Piper Aircraft Corp. at 18.
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tive was control of Piper.8 On January 23, 1969, Chris-Craft announced
a cash tender offer for 300,000 Piper shares at sixty-five dollars per share
and reserved the right to accept additional shares."
As a result of the cash tender offer, approximately 304,000 Piper
shares were tendered to Chris-Craft out of the approximately 900,000
which were then in the hands of the public. Chris-Craft continued to
purchase Piper shares on the market for cash. By February 27, it had
acquired approximately thirty-three percent of Piper's outstanding stock.
On that date, Chris-Craft filed a registration statement with the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission eovering an exchange offer for up to
300,000 shares of Piper stock. The registration statement did not become
effective until May 15, 1969 and, after being extended six times, was
withdrawn when Chris-Craft had obtained less than 40,000 shares
through the exchange offer.10
Upon receiving formal notification from Chris-Craft of the com-
mencement of the tender offer and of Chris Craft's tentative plans to ac-
quire a majority shareholder interest in Piper, William T. Piper, Presi-
dent of Piper, immediately countered with a series of defensive
maneuvers. These included several letters to Piper shareholders in which
the Chris-Craft offer was described as "inadequate" and the possibility
of more beneficial mergers was raised.
At the same time, Piper management and representatives of First Bos-
ton Corporation, Piper's investment bankers, rmet with representatives of
Grumman Aircraft Corporation in an effort to effectuate a merger between
Grumman and Piper. Piper management on January 29 issued a press
release, which it also mailed to its shareholders, stating that Grumman
Aircraft Engineering Corporation had agreed to purchase 300,000 shares
of Piper at sixty-five dollars per share and was studying the feasibility of
a combination of the two companies. The release stated that Piper could
expect to benefit materially from its association with Grumman."
Certain elements of the agreement between Grumman and Piper were
not disclosed in the press release. For example, the agreement included
a "put" clause which allowed Grumman to tender the 300,000 Piper
shares back to Piper at sixty-five dollars per share, plus interest at the
nominal annual rate of 31/ percent for a period of seven months, while it
8480 F.2d at 350.
9Id. at 351.
10 ld.
1 Id. The market reacted negatively to the announcement. The closing price of Piper
stock on the New York Exchange, which had been (4-1/4 on January 28, the day before
the press release, declined to 61-5/8 the day of the announcement and to 59-5/8 on February
3, 1969, the day on which Chris-Craft's cash tender offi-r terminated. Brief for Appellee
Piper Aircraft Corp. at 17.
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considered the desirability of a merger. Piper was obligated to segregate
the Grumman funds in trust so as to protect Grumman's "put." The
Grumman option agreement was subsequently cancelled. "
Meanwhile, Piper continued its defensive efforts. After consultation
with First Boston, Piper attempted unsuccessfully to acquire two unre-
lated companies outside the aircraft industry.13 In its search for a com-
patible merger, Piper had begun negotiating as early as January 1969
with Bangor Punta Corporation, but it was not until May 1969 that an
arrangement satisfactory to both corporations' managements was achieved.
Under the contract, the Piper family agreed to exchange its block of
501,o00 shares for a package of specified Bangor Punta common stock
and debentures. Bangor Punta also agreed to use its best efforts immedi-
ately to acquire additional Piper shares in order to increase its holdings
to more than fifty percent. It promised to make an offer to Piper's pub-
lic shareholders to exchange their stock for a package of Bangor Punta
securities. 14
On May 8 the parties issued a press release announcing the agree-
ment and that Piper shareholders would be offered a package of Bangor
Punta securities which would have a value in the written opinion of
First Boston of eighty dollars or more. The registration statement had
of course not yet been filed, and the precise composition of the Bangor
Punta package was not determined until July 18, the day its registra-
tion statement became effective. The Chris-Craft exchange offer had, in
the meantime, become effective on May 15.15
On May 26 the SEC insituted an action in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Columbia against Bangor Punta and Piper
alleging that the announcement of the eighty dollar estimate for an un-
specified and unregistered package of securities violated § 5(c) of the
Securities Act of 1933 and rule 135 thereunder. Bangor Punta and
Piper immediately agreed to a consent injunction against repetition of
similar announcements, without admitting the allegations of the com-
plaint.'(
The May 8 agreement between the Piper family and Bangor Punta
12480 F.2d at 351-52.
13 On March 23, 1969, Piper issued almost 470,000 authorized but unissued shires to
acquire U.S. Concrete Company of Florida and Southply, Inc. This increased the number
of outstanding Piper shares by about twenty-nine percent and, in the case of one of the
corporations posed a potential antitrust problem to Chris-Craft were it to obtain control
of Piper. The transactions were quickly rescinded, however, because Piper found itself in
violation of the rules of the New York Stock Exchange. 480 F.2d at 352.
.141d. at 353.
15Brief for Appellant Chris-Craft Indus. at 20-21.
16 480 F.2d at 353.
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piovided that if Bangor Punta obtained more than fifty percent of Pi-
per's shares, the consideration to be paid to the Piper family would be
increased by the difference between the value of the package of Bangor
Punta securities issued to Piper family members and eighty dollars a
share. As matters developed, the consequence of the provision was that
members of the Piper family stood to receive a premium of approximate-
ly thirteen million dollars for their Piper shares if Bangor Punta was able
to obtain majority share ownership. During the two months preceding
commencement of the Bangor Punta exchange offer, Piper management
sent several communications to its shareholders urging acceptance of that
offer. None of these letters mentioned the possible premium which the
Piper family might receive.17
The May 8 press release had not been the first aspect of the battle
to attract the attention of the Securities and Exchange Commission. On
April 7th, the SEC staff had summoned Piper and Chris-Craft to a meet-
ing and advised that in its view, rule 10b-6 under the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 prohibited a tender offeror from purchasing stock of a target
company during an exchange offer. Chris-Craft thereafter refrained
from buying Piper stock until after the close of its exchange offer." The
SEC staff also warned Piper insiders against purchasing Piper shares.
On May 5, the SEC issued a public release proposing rule lob-13 10 which
would explicitly prohibit the purchase of target company stock by a ten-
der offeror during its exchange offer.
First Boston, Bangor Punta and Piper all learned of the SEC press
release shortly after its issuance. Nonetheless, large block purchases had
already figured in the Bangor Punta strategy, and through purchase of
three blocks of stock between May 14 and May 23 Bangor Punta acquired
over 120,000 shares, or more than 71/ percent of Piper's outstanding
stock. 0
Additional subjects for litigation were yet to come. Bangor Punta's
registration statement in connection with the offer showed the Bangor
and Aroostook Railroad [hereinafter referred. to as BAR], a subsidiary
of Bangor Punta, as having a book value of $18.4 million. This figure
17 Brief for Appellant Chris-Craft Indus. at 23-24. This information did, however, appear
in Bangor Punta's preliminary prospectus sent to all shareholders long before the Piper letters
of June and July were mailed. In fact, shareholders were advised by Piper's June 4 letter "to
read and study the material carefully." Chris-Craft sent a letter to shareholders on July
16, 1969 discussing and criticizing the "bonus" provision and alerting shareholders to con.
sider its consequences. Brief for Appellee, Piper Aircraft Corp. at 24, Chris.Craft Indus.
v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir. 1973).
18480 F.2d at 352.
10 SEC Exchange Act Release No. 8595 (May 5, 1969).
20 Brief for Appellant Chris-Craft Industires at 24-27.
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was based on an appraisal by an investment banking firm made several
years earlier. The registration statement did not disclose that serious
talks had been initiated earlier that month between Bangor Punta and
Amoskeag Corporation for the sale of the railroad for $5 million. The
sale of the railroad at that figure was consummated by autumn and
produced a book loss to Bangor Punta of $13.8 million. This contrib-
uted to a net loss of $1.25 per share for 1969, and wiped out 36.5 percent
of Bangor Punta's retained earnings and twelve percent of shareholders'
book equity."'
As noted, the first Chris-Craft exchange offer had been unsuccessful.
Chris-Craft subsequently filed a new registration statement for a more at-
tractive exchange offer, which became effective on July 24 and lasted
until August 4 .22 The Bangor Punta exchange offer had been in effect
from July 18 until July 29. As a result of the competing exchange offers,
Chris-Craft acquired 112,300 shares and Bangor Punta 111,700 shares
(about seven percent of the outstanding shares) of Piper. The latter
amount, coupled with the seven percent it acquired through the exchange
offer, was enough to give Bangor Punta 50.8 percent of the shares of
Piper.2 Bangor Punta announced plans to merge Piper into Bangor
Punta soon thereafter.
Even before the battle for control was over, Chris-Craft commenced
an action for damages and equitable relief, alleging violations of the
securities laws by Bangor Punta and Piper and seeking an injunction
restraining both defendants from further interfering with Chris-Craft's
purchases of Piper stock. Chris-Craft was completely unsuccessful in its
efforts to obtain relief at the district court level. The motion for an in-
junction was denied as was a later motion by the SEC seeking to enjoin
Bangor Punta from further violations of the securities laws.2  Likewise
all claims for damages and equitable remedies were dismissed by the
district court, except that an SEC order was granted requiring Bangor
Punta to offer rescission to shareholders who accepted the Bangor Punta
exchange offer. -
II. STANDING: THE ISSUE UNDER SECTION 14(e)
AND RULE 10b-5
Chris-Craft pursued on appeal its contention that defendants had vio-
211d. at 31-32.
22480 F.2d at 354.
231d at 354.
24Id. at 355.
25 Chris-Craft Indus. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 337 F. Supp. 1128 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). See
discussion in text, note 74 infra.
1974]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
lated § 14(e) of the 1934 Act and rule 10b-5 when they issued improp-
er and misleading press releases, when Bangor Punta filed its exchange
offer registration statement with material omissions and when the Piper
family sent out letters to Piper shareholders with material omissions and
misstatemehts. Chris-Craft claimed damages for these alleged violations
of the anti-fraud provisions of the securities laws as a plaintiff in a unique
position-that of a defeated corporate contender for control suing both
the target corporation and the successful tender offeror. Never before
had a plaintiff in Chris-Craft's position been granted standing either un-
der rule 10b-5 or § 14(e) to sue for damages. This issue had never
been raised under § 14(e) and presented obvious difficulties under rule
lob-5. In order to successfully assert standing under rule 10b-5, a
plaintiff in Chris-Craft's position (at least in the Second Circuit) had to
show that it was a "purchaser" or "seller" of securities in accordance
with the rule in Birnbaum26 or show that it fell within an exception to
this requirement.
Chris-Craft relied heavily on Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake
Co.27 as affording it standing under rule 10b-5 to assert violations relat-
ing to the Piper family press releases and the Bangor Punta registration
statement. Crane, like Chris-Craft, was a defeated tender offeror, who
had sought to obtain control of Westinghouse Air Brake Company. In
an effort to prevent Crane's takeover, Air Brake and Standard devised
a merger proposal. In its tender offer, Crane had offered a package
of stock and debentures totalling fifty dollars for each Air Brake share.
On the final day of the Crane tender offer, Standard purchased 170,000
Air Brake shares on the New York Stock Exchange at an average cost
of $49.50, and then immediately sold the 100,000 shares in a private
transaction off the Exchange and 20,000 more at a negotiated price for an
average price of $44.50, thus taking an apparent loss of $500,000 on the
day's trading. Presumably the effect of this trading was to suggest to
the owners of Air Brake Securities that their Air Brake shares were worth
in excess of fifty dollars, and hence that it would be inadvisable to tender
to Crane. Later, at a special meeting of Air Brake shareholders called
to approve a merger between Air Brake and Standard, the proxy count
ran heavily in favor of the merger.
Crane's thirty-two percent holdings in Air Brake, acquired principal-
ly through its tender offer, were subsequently converted into Standard's
convertible preferred pursuant to the merger agreement. Thereafter in
response to Standard's threat of a divestiture action under the antitrust
26 Birmbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952).
27419 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1969), cert denied, 399 U.S. 909 (1970).
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laws, Crane sold all but 10,000 shares of its holdings in Standard at a
profit of several million dollars. The court of appeals found that Air
Brake had violated § 9(a) (2) of the Exchange Act28 and that the viola-
tionds had placed Crane in the position of a "forced seller" under rule
lob-5:
Standard acted for the "purpose of inducing" sale by Crane. Standard's
actions had the intended effect of inducing Crane to become a seller
within the meaning of Section 9(a)(2), for if successful in defeating
Crane's tender offer and consummating the merger, antitrust considera-
tions would require sale by Crane of the shares held by Crane or those
received in exchange.29
The court went on to hold that failure to disclose this trading scheme
to the shareholders constituted a violation of rule lob-5, stating that
the reliance requirement was satisfied where the deception misled share-
holders and thus, in consequence, caused Crane's injury. The court stated
that even under a narrow view of § 9(a) (2), Standard's conduct would
still be actionable under part (c) of rule lob-5, which proscribes con-
duct "operating as a fraud or deceit upon any person."
Chris-Craft argued that as a defeated contender for control it, like
the plaintiff in Crane, was a "locked-in buyer" which would be forced
to sell its shares in Piper at a substantial loss in the event Bangor Punta
chose to effect a merger with Piper. Thus, its position was analogous to
the position of the plaintiff in Crane as a "forced" seller. However, the
district court rejected Chris-Craft's argument that it stood in essentially
the same position as Crane, on the grounds that no merger was proposed
by Bangor Punta at the time of the litigation, although Bangor Punta
had stipulated to the Court that it would defer merger plans until the
litigation was resolved.
As an alternative to the "forced seller" theory, Chris-Craft asserted
standing under the exception to Birnbaum discussed in Iroquois Indus-
tries, Inc. v. Syracuse China Corp.30 In that case, Iroquois had proposed
a tender offer for 50,000 shares of Syracuse China. The management of
Syracuse China, Harold C. Brown & Co., Inc. (Brown), and Towle Com-
pany conspired to prevent Iroquois from obtaining Syracuse China shares
under its tender offer. Syracuse China sent letters to its shareholders
28 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78k(a)(2). Section 9(a)(2) proscribes
transactions in any security registered on a national securities exchange which have the effect
of "creating actual or apparent active trading in such security or raising or depressing the
price of such security, for the purpose of inducing the purchase or sale of such security by
others."
29 419 F.2d at 794.
30 417 F.2d 963 (2d Cir. 1969).
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falsely stating that it was negotiating a merger with Towle and that de-
tails of the merger would soon be released. In fact, no merger was ever
contemplated and statements to that effect were simply designed to in-
terfere with the tender offer. Brown refused to advise its customers of
the Iroquois tender offer, but instead advised them to sell their shares to
members of Syracuse China Management. Iroquois sought an injunction
against defendants, alleging that the misleading letters to Syracuse China
were in violation of rule 10b-5.3 Unimpressed, the district court denied
the injunction, stating that Iroquois had no standing to assert violations
of rule lOb-5.
The Birnbaum 'rule recognizes the policy of Congress in enacting Section
10(b) and of the Commission in adopting Rule 1ob-5, namely, the pro-
tection of defrauded purchasers and sellers. It is not the province of the
courts to extend Section lob to apply to transactions not intended to be
covered by Congress.32
But other language in Iroquois"3 implied that had plaintiff alleged
that during the tender offer it had been mislead as to any purchases and
sales by it of Syracuse China stock, plaintiff would have stated a cause of
action under rule 10b-5. Chris-Craft relied on this language in stating
its own cause of action under rule 10b-5 alleging that it had been mis-
led as to its purchases of Piper stock by misstatements about Piper's prod-
uct lines found in Piper's annual report. The district court rejected
this argument finding that Chris-Craft had made substantial purchases
after it had discovered that certain statements in the annual report were
misleading, thus throwing substantial doubt on Chris-Craft's reliance on
such misstatements.3 4
Notwithstanding its observation that the fraudulent acts involved in
the case were literally proscribed by rule lOb-5, the court of appeals
concluded that the major contribution of § 14(e) of the 1934 Act is to
provide a broader standing to the contestants to sue in a fraudulent se-
curities contest. Hence, the court dealt with the standing under § 14(e)
and specifically avoided deciding the issue of standing of Chris-Craft to
sue under rule lob-5.
The Second Circuit's steadfast adherence to the Birnbaum rule may
have been in part a reflection of the existence of § 14(e) since 1968.
31The SEC as amicus curiae had invited the court to overrule Birnbaum in favor of
the defeated tender offeror, asserting that Birnbaum had already been seriously weakened
by several decisions of the Second Circuit. The court flatly rejected this argument and
dismissed the Iroquois complaint. Id. at 967.
32 Id. at 969.
33 Id. at 967.
34 337 F. Supp. at 1144.
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The courts may have dismissed claims arising from violations of the se-
curities laws during tender offers brought under rule 10b-5 in order to
avoid further broadening the reach of rule lob-5, especially since §
14(e) on its face applied more appropriately to violations during tender
offers. 5 Chris-Craft argued this contention vigorously in asserting its
status as a plaintiff under § 14(e), citing Judge Friendly's language in
Crane:
The amendment to the Act adding Section 14(e) effective July 28, 1968,
should serve to resolve any doubts about standing in the tender offer
cases, even where an offeror is not ... in the position of a forced seller 3
The trial court in Chris-Craft had declined to deal with the question
of whether § 14(e) afforded standing to one competitor for corporate
control against another for violation of the securities laws in a tender
offer. The district court impliedly rejected the view that the dicta in
Crane applied to Chris-Craft's situation and commented that it more
appropriately applied to situations such as that in Electronic Specialt'
Co. v. International Controls Corp."
Electronic Specialty, the first case to deal directly with subsections
(e) and (f) of § 14 of the Exchange Act-where the parties seeking
standing to sue were the corporation and its shareholders, held that the
target corporation and its shareholders had standing to sue under § 14(e)
for antifraud violations, on the theory that § 14(e) was enacted to pro-
tect corporations from "raiders" and to protect shareholders of the target
corporation from fraudulent misrepresentations made during tender of-
fers. The court in Electronic Specialty viewed § 14(e) as essentially a
codification of rule lob-5: "[i]n effect this applies Rule iob-5 both to
the offeror and to the opposition .... "3 The plaintiffs in Electronic Spe-
cialty included the target corporation, a non-tendering shareholder and a
shareholder who had tendered one hundred shares to the offering corpor-
ation. As to this last shareholder, the court of appeals found no stand-
ing because a rescission offer had been made by the tender offeror, In-
ternational Controls. The remaining plaintiffs asserted claims against
International Controls for making misleading statements to the media,
allegedly for the purpose of driving down the price of target corporation
35 Indeed the court in Iroquois had observed that since Congress enacted § 14(e) to
prohibit fraud by "any person" in respect of tender offerors, it was an indication that in
tender offer contests neither the tender offeror nor the target corporation has standing to
sue under § 10b or rule 10b-5. 417 F.2d at 969.
s Crane v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787, 798-99 (2d Cir. 1969).
37409 F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1969).
381d. at 940.
1974]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
stock so as to make the tender offer for Electronic Specialty more at-
tractive.
On appeal, defendant argued that the target corporation lacked
standing to complain of a violation of § 14(d) or § 14(e) since it could
suffer no injury from a change in ownership of its stock. It further con-
tended that the target corporation was without standing to complain of
a violation of rule ob-5. It also argued that: the conduct of the non-
tendering shareholder disqualified him as a plaintiff. While not specif-
ically reaching the standing issue, the court reasoned that both the non-
tendering shareholder and the target corporation had standing under §
14(e) to sue for a permanent injunction. According to the court, al-
though a nontendering shareholder suffers no immediate injury from in-
adequacy of price in the sense that he retains his stock, such inadequacy
is likely to have a depressing effect on the market for some time and
thus may hurt him if, for one reason or another, he should later find it
necessary or desirable to sell. Such depression may also harm the target
corporation if it should wish to engage in financing or acquisitions and
a still different potential for harm to the corporation will exist where it
is claimed that the offeror has evil designs on its treasury or business
plans.39  N_
While the first decision interpreting § 14(e) was necessarily limited
by its facts to the situation where a target corporation and nontendering
shareholders sought an injunction to prevent violations of § 14(e), the
district court in Chris-Craft interpreted Electronic Specialty as outlining
the permissible limits of standing under § 14(e)-that the section prop-
erly extends standing only to the target corporation and its shareholders.
It is dear, however, that the district court skirted the entire issue of
standing by rendering findings on the rule 10b-5 claims, while deliber-
ately avoiding any finding of standing under either § 14(e) or rule lob-
5. In making such findings, the district court implicitly accepted the
notion that § 14(e) was a codification of the case law developed under
rule 10b-5 with the exception of the question of standing.
On appeal to the Second Circuit, Chris-Craft argued that there was
no such limitation on standing under § 14(e). o After avoiding the
issue of whether there is standing for a defeated tender offeror to sue
for damages under rule iob-5, the court found that § 14(e) is the fraud
provision which more appropriately provides the basis for Chris-Craft's
standing to sue 1 The court of appeals stated that there were two as-
pects to the standing question:
39 Id. at 946.
40 Brief for Appellant Chris-Craft Industries at 92.
41480 F.2d at 358.
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1. Whether Chris-Craft had an economic interest in holding defen-
dants to a fair standard of conduct in the tender offer situation and addi-
tionally, whether Chris-Craft had a real and personal stake in the out-
come of the litigation;
2. Whether Chris-Craft had a principal federal right of action under
§ 14(e) against each of the defendants and more specifically, whether
it had a claim for compensatory relief.42
The court of appeals noted that while § 14(e) is silent on the ques-
tion of a private remedy, the federal courts have many times implied a
damage remedy for litigants whose suits for damages have been based
on federal statutes lacking any express authorization. 43 Further, the
court found that its previous decisions showed nothing inherently un-
reasonable about extending standing to all parties in a tender offer situ-
ation and further noted that under common law principles, a right of
action exists when there is interference with a "prospective advan-
tage."4' 4  Hence, it would not infer from the silence of § 14(e) that
Congress intended to deny a federal remedy for such interference in a
tender offer and to extinguish a liability which under established prin-
ciples of tort law normally attends the doing of a proscribed act. Thus
the court concluded that a claim for relief under federal law is stated
when a defeated contestant for control has been put in a minority share-
holder position because of the wrongdoing of its opponent and the mar-
gin of victory is such that the defeated contestant can show it had a
reasonable chance of obtaining control of the target company, but lost
the opportunity because its opponent gained control through means il-
legal under federal law. Therefore, at least in the Second Circuit,46
participants in a tender offer contest are now protected by the prohibi-
42Id. at 359-60.
-3Id. at 356-57. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 402 (1971)
(Harlan, J., concurring); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
The court in Chris-Craft cited the holding in 3. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 US. 426
(1964) in which the Supreme Court found that § 27 of the Exchange Act granted standing
to a private party to sue for damages arising out of a violation of § 14 (a) and the proxy
rules thereunder and held that "no more effective means of furthering a statute exists than
to grant the victim of violation of the statute standing to sue for damages." Thus Chris.Craft
had standing to sue for damages under § 14 (e) since that section was designed to further fair
dissemination of information in tender offers. 480 F.2d at 361.
44 The court also -considered its decision in Butler Aviation International Inc. v. Compre-
hensive Designs, In., 425 F.2d 842 (2d Cir. 1970) in which the target company in a
tender offer sought A permanent injunction against the tender offeror. In Butler Av;euion,
the court expressly held that standing existed under § 14(e) at least as to a misstatement in
the offeror's annual report
45480 F.2d at.
4 G See Eason v. Gentral Motors Acceptance Corp., CCH FED. SEC. L REP. 1 94,344 (1974);
Manor Drug Stores v. Blue Chip Stamps, BNA No. 226 D-1 (9th Cir. 1973).
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tions on fraudulent conduct developed under rule lob-5. A defeated
tender offeror no longer need show that it was a "forced seller" to fit
within the Birnbaum doctrine under rule lob-5, but can now show stand.
ing under § 14(e) in a straightforward manner: assertion that it had a
reasonable chance for success under the tender offer had it not been for
the wrongdoing of the defendant.
The test for establishing standing is directly related to the manner
in which the court perceived the damages suffered by Chris-Craft. The
damage was not that the defeated contestant had to pay more for the
stock of the target company due to the securities law violations of its op-
ponent, but rather that it acquired less stock than it needed for control.
This view of the damage issue was foreshadowed in Crane where the
defeated tender offeror was granted standing to sue the target company
as a "forced seller," even though it later sold its minority holdings for a
profit of several million dollars. The court of appeals in Crane re-
manded the case, both on the issue of market, manipulation and decep-
tion on the part of the target company and also
for a further determination in the District Court of the appropriate rem-
edies. Without limitation, these remedies may include damages, if any,
prospective injunctive relief, as well as appropriate retrospective relief,
notwithstanding the consummation of the merger.... The manipulation
may be found to have deprived Crane of success in its tender offer Jn the
free market to which it was entitled, in which case divestiture or separa-
tion of Air Brake may be required.4T
The very fact that Crane was in the position of a defeated tender of-
feror by virtue of securities law violations regardless of any actual mone-
tary loss resulting from that defeat was enough for the court in Crane
to suggest a damage remedy to the district court.
Presumably a successful tender offeror might also have standing un-
der § 14(e). The standing of a successful tender offeror would neces-
sarily depend upon an injury caused by its increased cost to gain control
of the target company. Indeed, Bangor Punta made such an argument
in its cross action against Chris-Craft. The district court apparently
regarded the claim as frivolous and Bangor Punta as not an "apt" plain-
tiff to raise such issues. The court of appeals affirmed the district court's
dismissal, but only on the ground that Bangor Punta failed to adduce
sufficient evidence to prove that Chris-Craft violated the securities laws,
Apparently, given the proper sets of facts, the Second Circuit would hold
that a successful tender offeror had standing to seek damages against a
47 Crane v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787, 803-04 (2d Cir. 1970).
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defeated tender offeror for the increased cost it bore in gaining control
due to violations of the antifraud provisions by the defeated contestant.48
Th7e framing of the standing issue in terms of a showing that the
offeror had a "reasonable chance" of obtaining control of the target com-
pany, and in terms of the significance of the fact that the margin of
victory was a small percentage, deserves closer scrutiny. What the court
appears to be saying, particularly in light of its formulation of the dam-
age issue, is that if a successful tender offeror acquires through viola-
tion of the securities law a block of shares without which it would not
have taken control, and if the defeated tender offeror might have com-
peted for the same block of shares, then the defeated tender offeror has
standing to assert the harm it suffered, because its opponent gained con-
trol through means illegal under federal law. Under the court's formu-
lation, it would be irrelevant whether acquisition of such a block of
shares by the defeated tender offeror would have given it control. It is
enough that the illegally gained block foreclosed it from any opporlinity
for control. This formulation of the standing question is directly related
to the court's theory of causation and damage.
III. DiSCLOSURE STANDARDS UNDER SECTION 14(E)
The court of appeals held that because the language of § 14(e)
tracks the language of rule lob-5, a violation of § 14(e) is shown where
there is a material misstatement or omission in connection with a tender
offer and when such misstatement or omission is sufficiently culpable to
justify granting relief in accordance with the developed principles of law
under rule lOb-5. 2 Materiality and culpability are the two key concepts
in the formulation. Materiality focuses on the importance of the omitted
or misstated fact-whether a reasonable man would have relied on the
fact in his decision to invest or not. While the requirement of a showing
.of scienter has served to limit imposition of liability under rule lob-5 to
48480 F.2d at 381.
4 9 In the Second Circuit, mere negligence has not been sufficient to permit plaintiffs
to recover damages in a private action. See SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458
F.2d 1082 (2d Cir. 1972), nor has intent to defraud been an indispensable element in
a private action under rule lOb-5. See Shemtab v. Shearson Hamill & Co., 488 F.2d 422 (2d
Cir. 1971); Globus, Inc. v. Law Research Service, Inc., 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969).
The standard decided upon by the court of appeals for establishing scienter, taking into
account the different degrees of culpability which may arise from different levels of duty
to disclose, on the part of a person making a misleading tender offer, or a responsible
officer of a corporation making such offer, is whether plaintiff has established that defendant
either:
1. Knew the material facts that were misstated or omitted, or
2. Failed or refused to ascertain such facts when they were available to him or could
have been discovered by him with reasonable effort. 480 F.2d at 364.
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those whose actions have been sufficiently culpable to justify the remedy
sought against them,'0 the court's formulation of scienter, in Chris-Craft,
at least as it applied to the underwriter in a tender offer, attaches liabil-
ity to conduct which would not be sufficiently culpable to justify a dam-
age remedy under rule lOb-5.
Also, the court of appeals specifically incorporated the fiduciary duty
of management of the target corporation to its shareholders in determin-
ing § 14(e) violations, thus making specific under § 14(e) what has
been incorporated by implication into rule lob-5 on an ever-increasing
basis. By apparently adopting the "high fiduciary duty" of management
of the target corporation to its shareholders for the determination of
whether any misstatements or omissions were material and whether, in
fact, there had been reliance by the shareholders, the court undertook
the development of a body of federal corporate law governing the be-
havior of the parties in a tender offer. According to the court, those
with greater access to information, or having a special relationship to
investors making use of the information, often may have an affirmative
duty to disclose. 51
1. Piper Management-Liability
The Court took into consideration the high fiduciary duty of fair deal-
ing and honesty which the Piper family owed its shareholders in finding
that the January shareholder letters which described the tender offer as
"inadequate" were in violation of § 14(e). Under state corporate law in
some jurisdictions management of the target corporation in a tender of-
fer owes a fiduciary duty to the shareholders to "evaluate" the tender of-
fer. Such evaluations are typically protected by the "business judgment"
rule should the comments or recommendations prove incorrect. Chris-
Craft effectively expanded this fiduciary duty beyond merely commenting
upon which of two competing tender offers might be more favorable to
shareholders to a duty of management to be "meticulous and precise"
in their representations to shareholders. The court reasoned that share-
holders are likely to rely heavily upon the representations of corporate
insiders.52  Characterizations of Chris-Craft's tender offer as "inade-
50 Id. at 363.
51 Id. at 368.
5 2 1n White v. Abrams, 42 U.S.L.W. 2518 (9th Cir. March 15, 1974), the Ninth Circuit
severely criticized the approach taken by the Second Circuit in Chris-Craft on the question of
the duty of disclosure undir Rule 10b-5:
We believe it unfortunate that the Second Circuit attempted to limit this duty by
requiring some degree of scienter or culpability and holding that mere negligent
conduct would not be sufficient for liability. The exact standard that the court
would apply, however, is not clear to us. The court's reasoning in defining culpa-
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quate" in William Piper's letters to Piper shareholders, while perhaps
intended as purely an expression of opinion of future value, was not
deemed to be sufficiently "meticulous and precise" to satisfy the high
fiduciary duty of Piper management to disclose their reasons for oppos-
ing Chris-Craft's offer. Apparently corporate management must fully
disclose their analytical process to their shareholders with the concomi-
tant risk that if it omits to disclose a fact to its shareholders which is
later found to be "material" to an evaluation of the tender offer by the
shareholders, it will be held to have violated § 14(e). This would be
true regardless of whether or not management's evaluation of the tender
offer would stand under the "business judgment" rule under state cor-
porate law or whether the omitted or misstated fact actually entered into
management's own evaluation of the tender offer. To the extent that
management of a target company comments upon the tender offer, the
implication of the court's opinion is to suggest that management should
dearly and explicitly separate "price" from "value" of the shares in com-
menting upon the fairness of the tender offer and further, emphasize
whether or not, under current market prices, the shareholders stand to
make an immediate economic gain if they accept the tender offer price
for their shares. Management can then attempt to explain that the
shareholders may gain long-term "value" by retaining their sharesY3
Management's failure to describe the "put" clause in the Grumman
agreement was a far more serious and obvious violation than its failure
to adequately discuss the merits of the Chris-Craft offer. This omission
was found to have been a possible cause of the shareholders failure to
tender, even though announcement of the Grumman agreement did not
have its intended effect of driving up the price of Piper shares.
Under state corporate law in most jurisdictions, management has a
duty to seek shareholder approval for a merger and to the extent that it
bility was, first, to ask what duty of disclosure the law should impose upon the per-
son being sued, second, to examine factors such as the access to information or
special relationships that may impose an "affirmative duty" of disclosure, third, to
decide whether the person has knowingly or recklessly failed to discharge these
duties. The court then summarized that these three liability factors could be stated
as: "whether plaintiff has established that defendent either (1) knew the material
facts that were misstated or omitted, or (2) failed or refused to ascertain such facts
when they were available to him or could have been discovered by him titb frea-
sonable effort." 408 F.2d at 364 (emphasis added). It may well be that the ana-
ysis in Chris-Craft accurately reflects what the courts have been doing in deciding
what state of mind is sufficient for recovery under rule lOb-5, but we choose not to
adopt it. We have difficulty with the court's announced position that mere negli-
gence is not sufficient for liability while in the same case it summarizes with lan-
guage that sets. forth a negligence standard, at least for persons with a special duty.
(footnotes omitted).
5 480 F.2d at 364.
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communicates to its shareholders about the merger, full and accurate
disclosure of all material facts must be made under the standards devel-
oped under Rule 10b-5 and, in case of a defensive merger as in Chris-
Craft, under § 14(e). Had Piper management described the "put"
clause in the Grumman agreement, management's use of a defensive
merger would presumably be protected by the "business judgment"
rule under various state corporate laws. The court, at least as to its
ruling on the Grumman agreement, did not expand § 14(e) to restrict
management's use of various defensive techniques2 4
Piper management was also found to have violated § 14(e) on the
basis of its failure to describe in letters to its shareholders in June and
July that the Piper family would profit if Bangor Punta gained control
rather than Chris-Craft. Under state corporate law, management has a
duty to disclose to its shareholders any material interest which they
might have in a transaction, regardless of whether the transaction meets
the state's standards of "fairness" to the corporation. Such an interest
may affect management's choice of one contender over the other, and
'thus is a material fact about which the shareholder should be apprised
in evaluating management's recommendation. Actually, Piper manage-
ment may have failed in its fiduciary duty to the corporation under the
"fairness" doctrine developed in some states, since by contracting for a
thirteen million dollar bonus for its shares, it appropriated a bonus be-
longing to the corporation. The court of appeals ignored the issue of the
propriety of the deal and simply incorporated into § 14(e) the fiduciary
duty of management t'o reveal any interest in a transaction about which
it is communicating to its shareholders in the same manner in which this
duty has been incorporated under rule 10b-5 in situations involving the
purchase and sale of securities.5
2. Bangor Punta's Liability
Bangor Punta's liability arose from its misstatements and omissions
concerning BAR in its registration statement filed with the SEC. The
court held that under standards of materiality and culpability, Bangor
Punta was required to disclose to Piper shareholders the circumstances
surrounding the negotiations for sale of BAR, as well as the effect of
such negotiations 0
The court of appeals couched Bangor Punta's liability for material
omissions and misstatements in the registration statements in terms of a
4ld. at 365.
551d. at 365-66.
56Id. at 370. £
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"duty" to Piper shareholders. The court imposed on a tender-offeror the
duty to act reasonably in discovering and disclosing material information
relating to the offer as of the time of the transaction. Presumably, the
facts which a tender offeror must make a reasonable effort to ferret out
are those relating to the desirability of the offered shares and not those
which might influence the judgment of shareholders of the target corpo-
ration for other reasons. In particular, the court did not require Bangor
Punta to disclose to Piper shareholders that Piper management stood
to reap a bonus if Bangor Punta gained control-a fact which the court
determined was "material" to Piper shareholders in letters from Piper
management. Duty to disclose and breach of that duty under § 14(e)
are necessarily a function of the defendant's relationship to the target
corporation's shareholders, as is the determination of what is material
and what is not. Because of the difference in relationships to the share-
holders of the target corporation, Bangor Punta's duty of disclosure was
not held to be co-extensive with the "meticulous and precise" standard
to which management of the target corporation was required to conform,
since that standard was directly related to the high fiduciary duty which
Piper management owed to its shareholders. The lesson to contestants
is clear: they must disclose only those facts which relate to the investment
value of the exchange package which they are offering.
3. First Boston's Liability
First Boston's liability under § 14(e) was based upon its activities as
the underwriter and dealer-manager for Bangor Punta's exchange offer.
The court of appeals held First Boston liable as an "aider and abettor"
of the issuer in its violations of § 14(e) .Y After having found that the
carrying value of BAR in the financials was materially misleading, the
court propounded the theory that an underwriter, such as First Boston,
aware of a material misstatement or omission in the exchange offer or
"reckless" in determining whether such material misstatement or omis-
sion existed, can be an aider and abettor in violation of § 14(e). Un-
der such a standard, First Boston was held liable as having been "reck-
less" in its failure to determine that sale of BAR was imminent and that
the valuation of BAR contained in the Bangor Punta exchange offer reg-
istration statement was inflated?8 The court, in effect, found scienter
as to First Boston as a matter of law.
Notwithstanding the court's formulation of the applicable standard
as one of "recklessness," the court may have actually imposed a duty
57 Id. at 370.
581d.
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upon the underwriter similar to the "due diligence" standard under §§
1I(a) (5) " and 12(2) " of the 1933 Act-in other words, assuming that
other elements of a violation under § 14(e) are present, scienter will be
found with respect to the underwriter unless it can show that it made a
"reasonable investigation" which would satisfy the standards set out in
Escott v. BarChris Construction Corp."' BarChris set out the requirement
that an underwriter may not rely merely upon oral questioning of cor-
porate management or corporate counsel in testing the accuracy of the
registration statement. Rather, the underwriter must test the accuracy
of the statements contained in the registration by examining the under-
lying documents. Although the underwriter may rely on certified finan-
cials, it must test the text of the registration in light of those financials
for consistency. Unless the underwriter can show that he has conducted
a "reasonable investigation," and thus has been duly diligent, it will be
held liable under §§ 11(a) (5) and 12(2) of the 1933 Act, according to
the BarChris formulation.
In Chris-Craft, the court held that First Boston was "reckless" be-
cause it failed to determine that the sale of BAR. was imminent and thus
that the carrying value of BAR was misleading. First Boston did ques-
tion corporate management about the probability of the sale of BAR,
after having been alerted to such possibility in the corporate minutes. The
court of appeals held, however, that this oral questioning was not enough.
First Boston, according to the court, should have pursued the matter
further to the point of questioning management of the potential pur-
chaser. It appears that "recklessness" now encompasses the underwrit-
er's failure to be "duly diligent"-even to the point of testing certified
financials. By placing the burden on the underwriter to show that it
conducted a "reasonable investigation," of the kind sufficient to satisfy
the standards in BarChris, the court has lessened the plaintiff's burden
in proving scienter. Indeed Chris-Craft comes dangerously close to shift-
ing the burden of proof to the defendant on the question of scienter.
Plaintiff may now rest after showing that the underwriter failed to as-
certain certain facts which were available to him. The underwriter can
no longer rely upon a showing that he questioned corporate management
or counsel-even as to those facts in certified financials-but rather he
must show that he tested all material information by reference to under-
lying documents or by a further investigation.
59 15 U.S.C. § 77K(a)(5) (1971).
'O 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1971).
01283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
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B. Causation
The principle of law enunciated by the district court which was most
hotly contested on appeal was the formulation of causation under §
14(e). The district court believed that Chris-Craft, in order to show the
required causation, had to prove that had it not been for the violation of
the securities laws by the defendants, the Piper shareholders would have
tendered their shares to Chris-Craft. Chris-Craft offered no such evi-
dence at trial. Using this unusually strict standard of causation, the
district court found that Chris-Craft had failed to show that it suffered
any harm because of the violations. Had the district court viewed Chris-
Craft's damage not as loss of control of Piper, but rather loss of the op-
portunity for control of Piper, it might have viewed the causation issue
differently. It was clear that Bangor Punta gained control through its
violations, and by virtue of its acquisition of a majority of the shares of
Piper it foreclosed any opportunity for Chris-Craft to acquire the com-
pany.
The district court emphasized that since Chris-Craft was a highly so-
phisticated corporate investor, it was not deceived by any of the viola-
tions of the defendants. But the court of appeals saw the deception of
Chris-Craft as irrelevant to the harmful effect of the violations. The re-
liance of the Piper shareholders on the deception was the harm com-
plained of and the ultimate cause of Chris-Craft's injury."
The court of appeals noted that a subjective test, taking into account
the plaintiff's general expertise, familiarity with the affairs of the corpo-
ration and access to information about the corporation is sometimes ap-
propriate in judging the reliance of the plaintiff. Such a standard is in-
appropriate, however, in a situation, such as a tender offer, where the
dealings between plaintiff and defendant are wholly impersonal and
where factors that influence investor decisions are not readily apparent.
Instead the principle of "constructive reliance" is appropriate in dass
actions where proof that each individual member of the class relied on
the deception would be impossible.63 The court presumed that, absent
the various material misrepresentations discussed above, Piper sharehold-
ers might not have tendered their shares to Bangor Punta, and thus
Bangor Punta would not have acquired the critical seven percent neces-
sary for its success.
According to the analysis employed by the court, there is a potential
distinction between causation resulting in the loss of Chris-Craft's op-
62 Chris-Craft Indus. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 373, tirng List v. Fashion
Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965).
63 480 F.2d at 375.
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portunity to compete for control of Piper and the actual causation of an
economic loss. The court relied on language in Affiliated Ute Citizens
v. United States,64 where the Supreme Court stated that "this obligation
to disclose and this withholding of a material fact establish the requisite
element of causation in fact.""
At least one district court interpreted the language in Affiliated Ute
Citizens in a similar manner before the decision in Chris-Craft. In Guar-
antee Insurance Agency Co. v. Mid-Continental Realty Corp.," plaintiff
alleged violations of § 10(b) and rule 10b-5 based on material omis-
sions from a prospectus, which had failed to disclose that defendant Mid-
Continental was subject to a special risk of having its tax assessment on
property increased. Plaintiff alleged that it purchased convertible de-
bentures and common stock of the defendant in reliance on the prospec-
tus, but failed to allege that the market value of its investment had de-
clined because of the omission in the prospectus. Defendant moved to
dismiss the complaint on the grounds that it failed to state a claim be-
cause of the failure to allege causation. While the district court agreed
that causation was an element of the case, it interpreted the language in
Affiliated Ute Citizens as holding that causation in fact is established by
showing that the undisclosed facts were material. In this context, the
courts have adopted what is in essence a "but for" test of causation, i,e.
but for the misstatement or omission, the reasonable investor would have
acted differently.
Professor Bromberg refers to causation in this context as "causation
of the transaction" and he draws a distinction between causation of the
transaction and causation of the economic loss."' The defendant in
Guarantee Insurance Agency Co. raised the issue that it should not be
liable for monetary damages if the drop in market price of plaintift's
securities resulted from a situation totally unrelated to the tax assessment
omitted in the prospectus. The court, noting that Bromberg character-
izes this issue as "causation of the economic loss," viewed this as a dam-
age issue unrelated to the question of whether "causation" as an element
of a cause of action has been successfully stated,68 but it dismissed the
complaint as to damages since an allegation of causation of the economic
loss is essential in a cause of action for damages under rule 10b-5.
The Second Circuit used a similar approach to the causation issue in
Chris-Craft. In order to establish causation, it was not necessary for
64406 U.S. 128 (1972).
65 1d. at 154.
66 57 F.R.D. 555 (N.D. I1. 1972).
672 A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW FRAUD § 8.7(2) at 216 (1973).
68 57 F.R.D. at 560.
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Chris-Craft to establish that the Piper shareholders would have tendered
to it but for the misrepresentations of the defendants, thus directly caus-
ing Chris-Craft's loss of control. Rather, Chris-Craft need only show
that but for the omissions, the Piper shareholders might not have ten-
dered to Bangor Punta, a fact which is established by the materiality of
the misstatement or omission-but for the material misstatements the
shareholders may have acted differently i.e. not tendered at all or tendered
to Chris-Craft. A presumption exists that because of the violation Chris-
Craft was denied an opportunity to acquire additional shares. If the
Piper shareholders had, in fact, held onto their shares, Chris-Craft would
not have suffered its injury-an opportunity would still have existed to
acquire control of Piper.
The question whether the Piper shareholders would have tendered
to Chris-Craft if they had not tendered their shares to Bangor Punta is
relevant only to the issue of damages. To the extent that the defendants
could have shown, even assuming fairness, that Piper shareholders would
not have tendered to Chris-Craft, damages would have been mitigated.
This burden, an extremely difficult one, would be on the defendants in
order to rebut a reasonable presumption of damages.
IV. RULE iob-6
Chris-Craft also claimed that it was damaged when Bangor Punta
purchased three large blocks of Piper stock in May 1969 in violation of
rule iob-6 under the 1934 Act. Rule iob-6 prohibits bids for or pur-
chases of a security by or on behalf of the issuer of the securitiy if the
security is the subject of a distribution. The prohibition includes bids
for or purchases of "any right to purchase any such security." During
the pendancy of the Bangor Punta exchange offer, Piper shares repre-
sented a right to acquire Bangor Punta securities.
In an earlier decision (when Chris-Craft had appealed the denial of
a motion for a preliminary injunction) the court of appeals had held
that the block purchases contravened the basic prohibition of rule 10b-6,
but left open the question of the applicability of an exemption from the
rule or the deteianination of the proper remedy. The trial court ruled
that the exemption was unavailable, but concluded that in the context
of an action for damages (as contrasted with a suit for an injunction)
the technical violations asserted lacked sufficient substance to merit seri-
ous consideration as a basis for money damages.
The trial court based its holding on the complete lack of any evi-
dence that Chris-Craft would have achieved control of Piper if Bangor
Punta had not made the block purchases. In addition, the court found
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that neither Chris-Craft nor any Piper shareholders had been misled
by any of the block purchases. Noting what it characterized as the local
and unpublicized nature of the purchases, the court concluded that they
had occurred outside the conventional flow of the securities markets,
Concluding that the purchases met the spirit of the exemption, if not
the letter, the trial court found that the purchases were substantial in
amount and were effected in such manner that they had no stimulating
effect on the market. The approach of the trial court evidences a view
that violation of the technical requirements of rule iob-6'creates a re-
buttable presumption as to market effect of the violation.
The court of appeals disagreed. Instead the fact of a technical vio,
lation of the rule was presumed to result in the undesirable market ef-
fect and in reliance thereon. This presumption, moreover, was held
to be impliedly conclusive."9 Given the holding oi the court that stand-
ing was not limited to purchasers of manipulated securities, a finding of
a violation of rule 10b-6 by a contestant for corporate control leaves only
the measurement of damages to be resolved.
As with the acquisition by Bangor Punta of Piper shares pursuant
to the exchange offer, damage was held to have occurred because of the
denial to Chris-Craft of the opportunity for control of Piper. The un-
lawful block purchases gave Bangor Punta a seven-percent advantage
in its quest for control of Piper. Since Bangor Punta ultimately ac-
quired only about fifty-two percent of the outstanding Piper stock, the
block purchases were essential to Bangor Punta's gaining control, and
thus denied to Chris-Craft the opportunity for control. Hence, the
court held that the attainment by Bangor Punta of a majority position
through its unlawful block purchases of Piper stock caused a decline in
the value of the Piper stock held by Chris-Craft. Thus, the violation
of rule 10b-6 by Bangor Punta resulted in a compensable injury to Chris-
Craft.70
V. DAMAGES
During the two and one half year period between Chris-Craft's mo-
tion for a preliminary injunction in July of 1969 and the completion
of a trial on the merits, Bangor Punta operated Piper as a division. The
company changed in many material respects from the one which Chris-
Craft originally sought; thus, by the time of the trial, Chris-Craft was
no longer content with a simple injunction against the voting of the
Piper shares illegally acquired by Bangor Punta, even though such an
10 480 F.2d at 378.
701d. at 378-79.
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injunction would have given Chris-Craft real voting control of the com-
pany. The remedy which Chris-Craft sought unsuccessfully in the dis-
trict court was compensatory damages for the disastrous effect its locked-
in minority position in Piper had on the value of its Piper stock. On
appeal, Chris-Craft argued successfully that once it is determined that de-
fendants seized control by violations of the securities laws, Chris-Craft
had shown injury by the obvious fact that a forty-three percent locked-
in minority position was worth far less than it would have been if Chris-
Craft had acquired the illegally controlled block. The only issue remain-
ing for the court of appeals was to compute damages by calculating the
difference in value between a control block and a forty-three percent un-
marketable block of Piper shares. Chris-Craft further argued that de-
fendants could not escape imposition of a remedy simply because such
computation would be extremely difficult since the court was under a
duty to fashion an effective remedy. 1
The court of appeals found that damages were an appropriate rem-
ed; to compensate Chris-Craft for its financial loss and attempted to
provide guidance to the district court as to the sort of relief it should
grant at the very least. The court noted that divestiture of the illegally-
acquired shares would be too difficult to administer and might reopen the
battle for control. The measure of damages decided upon by the court
was the one suggested by Chris-Craft: the reduction in the appraisal
value of Chris-Craft's Piper holdings attributable to Bangor Punta's tak-
ing a majority position, and thus being able to compel merger at any-
time. The court further decided that damages should be assessed
against all defendants jointly and severally, although no specific find-
ing had been made that Piper management had contributed to the ma-
terial omissions or misstatements in Bangor Punta's registration7 2
The court also granted Chris-Craft's prayer on appeal for equitable
relief, which it had abandoned at trial, resulting in a devastating in-
junction barring Bangor Punta, for a period of at least five years, from
voting the Piper shares which it obtained through the purchases in vio-
lation of rule iob-6 and through its exchange offer. 3 This prohibition
would not apply to those Piper shares retransferred to former Piper
shareholders upon acceptance of the rescission offer ordered by the dis-
trict court. The effect of the court of appeals ruling would be to enable
Chris-Craft to assume a management position in the company (assuming
the majority of the shareholders to whom Bangor Punta makes it res-
T1 Brief for Appellee Piper Aircraft Corp. at 100.
72480 F.2d at 380.
73 Id.
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cission offer do not accept it). Bangor Punta Corporation and its officers
therefore found themselves in the position of paying potentially huge
sums in damages for a benefit which they could not enjoy for five years.
VI. INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
An additional problem considered by the court of appeals involved
the criteria to be used in granting injunctive relief. The Securities and
Exchange Commission had filed a complaint against Bangor Punta
Corp. on September 9, 1970, to enjoin Bangor Punta from further viola-
tions of the securities laws and to obtain an order offering rescission to
all shareholders of Piper Aircraft Corporation who had exchanged their
shares of Piper common stock for Bangor Punta securities.
In its opinion filed on August 25, 1971, 71 the district court found
that sufficiently serious consideration of the possibility of a sale of the
BAR had been given so that the directors of Bangor Punta could not
have believed that the $18.4 million appraisal figure represented the
true market value of the railroad. It also found that the omission of facts
which rendered the appraisal obsolete was material considering the mag-
nitude of the loss which appeared likely. The district court did not
find, however, that Bangor Punta, prior to August 27, 1969, had decided
to sell the railroad to Amoskeag and hence concluded that Bangor Punta
had not deferred the closing in order to avoid disclosure in the pending
registration. Nonetheless, because of the material misstatement of the
figure at which BAR was carried, the district couxt ordered Bangor Punta
to make a rescission offer.
The SEC appealed the judgment of the district court on two separate
issues:
1. The Commission argued that the district court applied an errone-
ous standard in denying its request for an injunction and, in any event,
argued that the district court abused its discretion in not granting the
injunction; and
2. The Commission argued that the district court erred in requiring
the former Piper shareholders to pay Bangor Punta, as a prerequisite
to rescission, any profits realized by them for the sale of the Bangor Pun-
ta securities originally obtained by them in the exchange offer.
In objecting to the standard for injunction applied by the district
court, the Commission argued that such a standard imposed an addition-
al requirement never before required in an injunction case-that of
showing "bad faith" or "evil motive." The Second Circuit had on a
previous occasion held that the standard to be applied was whether there
74 SEC v. Bangor Punta Corp., 331 F. Supp. 1154 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
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was a reasonable likelihood that the wrong will be repeated 5 Such
reasonable likelihood, the Commission argued, had been already demon-
strated in light of the defendant's past violationsY5
The Commission urged that the standards of public interest (not
the requirements of private litigation) should measure the propriety of
injunctive relief in cases where the Commission seeks relief, and that
the court should be more liberal in granting injunctions, once it has
found an unquestioned violation of the law by the defendant, particu-
larly in light of the difficulty of the Government's inspecting, investi-
gating and litigating every complaint of a violation7
Additionally, the Commission argued that the district court erred in
requiring former Piper shareholders to pay to Bangor Punta, as a pre-
requisite for rescission, any profits realized from sale of the Bangor Pun-
ta securities originally obtained in the exchange offer. The Commission
pointed out that the court by its order had placed Bangor Punta in a
preferred position. Under the order, Bangor Punta would obtain the
benefit of "profits" obtained by rescinding shareholders who might pur-
chase substitute securities at a price exceeding the proceeds from their
sale of original securities.
Although the court of appeals removed the restrictions placed on the
rescission order by the district court, it upheld the "natural inclination
or prospensity to violate" standard applied by the district court in refus-
ing the injunction, over a strong dissent by Judge Timbers. Judge Mans-
field and Judge Gurfein affirmed the district court's decision in this re-
gard on the ground that the district court's finding was not "clearly
erroneous," thus withholding their imprimatur on the standard chosen
by the district court. Further, the majority of the court held that the
difference between the standards "propensity or natural inclination" and
75 SECv. Culpepper, 270 F.2d 241, 250 (1959).
76Brief for Appellants SEC at 30.
771Te Commission argued further that, even assuming that the district court chose the
correct standard for granting relief, it abused its discretion in denying such relief when
Bangor Punta had filed a misleading registration statement and prospectus where:
(a) The company was under a court injunction to file documents complying with
the registration provisions of the federal securities laws;
(b) The misleading omissions were of facts well known to the company's directors
and management;, and
(c) The factual omissions were of undoubted materiality to the company's ex-
change offer, which formed a crucial part of its contest for control of Piper.
Since the nondisclosure was "not merely negligent" but something more, the Commis-
sion argued that on that ground alone the injunction should have been granted. The Com-
mission further argued that since Bangor Punta failed to disclose highly material facts within
its knowledge, it must be deemed likely to repeat its violation. Id.
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"reasonable likelihood that the wrong will be repeated" is possibly mere-
ly semantic, and in any event not sufficiently different to merit reversal."
Judge Timbers saw a meaningful distinction between the two stan-
dards and therefore dissented as to the refusal to grant injunctive relief.
In his opinion, the standard "propensity or natural inclination" requires
a showing of intent, which is tantamount to converting a proceeding
for a civil injunction into a criminal one. Further, Judge Timbers urged
that all doubts about granting an injunction sought to protect the public
interest should be resolved in favor of granting the injunction. Judge
Timbers found that Bangor Punta's conduct was so flagrant a violation
of the antifraud sections in the face of a consent order that it could
not be heard to claim that its conduct was not clearly unlawful. Because
Bangor Punta was a diversified conglomerate, there was a reasonable
likelihood, in his view, that it would become involved in similar tender
offers in the future, which increased the likelihood of similar violations. 0
Chris-Craft has not clarified to any great degree the standard for grant-
ing a permanent injunction in the Second Circuit. Since the precedential
value of the case was greatly weakened by two judges affirming solely
because the trial court was not clearly erroneous, it,does bode ill for the
Commission in its efforts to seek such injunctions. In view of the cir-
cumstances of this case showing a pattern of rather flagrant violations
by Bangor Punta, the refusal of the court of appeals to reverse the dis-
trict court either as to the standard for granting the injunction or as to
its findings under such a standard sets a dangerous precedent for SEC
enforcement efforts. If under facts so favorable for the granting of an
injunction, the court cannot be persuaded to grant one, then the SEC
has had a powerful weapon in its arsenal of enforcement techniques ren-
dered ineffective.
VII. CONCLUSION
Chris-Craft v. Piper Aircraft Corp. has clarified in many respects the
standards of corporate behavior expected of all the participants in a
tender offer. The actions of management of the target corporation in
opposing an offer are to be tempered by the high fiduciary duty owed to
its shareholders; the contestants themselves are to be governed by anti-
fraud standards nearly identical to those under rule lob-5. The deci-
sion has served to confuse the responsibilities of the underwriter in a
tender offer and, at least until Chris-Craft is clarified by subsequent deci-
sions in this area, the underwriter must conduct a thorough "due dili.
78 Chris-Craft Indus. v. Piper Aircraft, 480 F.2d at 405.
79 Id. at 388.
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gence" investigation of the issuer to avoid the enormous liability which
may befall it under § 14(e), should it be held to have been culpable
under the very nebulous "recklessness" standard.
With a greater degree of certainty, the court established one definite
taboo in a tender offer: the purchase of shares by a contestant during the
pendancfof an exchange offer is outlawed. Unless this standard is modi-
fied by later decisions, such a purchase will trigger certain liability with
only the damages remaining to be calculated.
The Second Circuit will undoubtedly further refine its standards for
the granting of permanent injunctions against securities law violators.
Until then, the corporate defendant in a suit for an injunction can take
heart that the Chris-Craft decision is a precedent, albeit a weak one,
which weighs heavily in the defendant's favor.
